We analyze the role of consumer expectations in a Hotelling model of price competition when products exhibit network e¤ects. Expectations can be strong (stubborn), weak (pricesensitive) or partially stubborn (a mix of weak and strong). As a rule, the price-sensitivity of demand declines when expectations are more stubborn. An increase of stubbornness i) reduces competition, ii) increases (decreases) the parameter region with a unique duopoly equilibrium (multiple equilibria), iii) reduces the con ‡ict between consumer and social preferences for de facto standardization, and iv) reduces the misalignment between consumer and social preferences for compatibility.
Introduction
Network e¤ects play an important role in many software and digital markets (Shapiro and Varian, 1999) . They arise when consumer utility increases in the number of other consumers using compatible products. 1 Competition between incompatible products leads to strategic uncertainty and coordination problems when consumers' choices are essentially simultaneous.
In those settings the formation of expectations about other consumers' purchasing decisions becomes a critical determinant of market performance; or as Farrell and Klemperer (2007, p. 2025) have put it: "As in any game with multiple equilibria, expectations are key. If players expect others to adopt, they too will adopt" (emphasis in original). Moreover, the sheer power of consumer expectations may drive market outcomes such that they become self-ful…lling: "In a real sense, the product that is expected to become the standard will become the standard" (Shaprio and Varian, 1999, p. 14, emphasis in original) .
In this paper we analyze how the formation of consumer expectations a¤ects duopoly competition and market outcomes when …rms o¤er incompatible products. We distinguish between weak and strong expectations. 2 The notion of strong expectations mirrors the fact that consumers may stubbornly favor a particular market outcome. In that case, consumers do not revise their expectations according to …rms'pricing decisions. In contrast, we refer to weak expectations when consumers are completely uncommitted to any initial expectations about …rms' market shares. Expectations then fully take account of …rms'competitive actions.
Our notion of strong expectations builds on Katz and Shapiro (1985) who analyzed a Cournot oligopoly model with network e¤ects. They proposed to solve for the ful…lled expectations Cournot-Nash equilibrium. In their set-up consumers form expectations about …rms' network sizes before market competition occurs. Hence, when expectations are strong, they do not respond to …rms'market actions, so that …rms must treat them as given when choosing prices.
Yet, rationality requires that expectations are self-ful…lling in equilibrium.
In contrast, weak expectations are fully price-sensitive such that they depend on …rms' actual competitive behavior. Accordingly, weak expectations are formed after …rms make their 1 More generally, network e¤ects may also arise when consumers care about the social in ‡uence of their consumption decisions (see Becker 1991 , Corneo and Jeanne 1997a /b, or Grilo, Shy, and Thisse 2001 decisions (see, e.g., Farrell and Saloner, 1992) . The weak expectations case is solved under standard Nash equilibrium requirements. As a consequence, weak expectations are ful…lled onand o¤-equilibrium.
In contrast to Katz and Shaprio (1985) we analyze the role of expectations under duopolistic price competition with …rms o¤ering incompatible products that exhibit positive network e¤ects. Products are horizontally di¤erentiated à la Hotelling. We suppose a linear setting, where network e¤ects are linearly increasing in network size with slope b > 0 and horizontal di¤erentiation is linearly increasing in distance with parameter t > 0.
We combine both weak and strong expectations within a single model. We analyze both polar cases as well as the "mixed" case. In the latter scenario, consumer expectations are a hybrid of weak and strong expectations. These expectations can be described as partially stubborn.
We parameterize the mixed case by (with 0 1) which measures the degree by which expectations are weak. Conversely, 1 indicates the degree of stubbornness.
Our analysis of network e¤ects within a Hotelling model extends the works of Farrell and Saloner (1992) , Baake and Boom (2001) , and Grilo, Shy, and Thisse (2001) . 3 Those papers have exclusively focused on the weak expectations case. We contribute to that literature by analyzing di¤erent types of consumer expectations. Our approach allows us to compare di¤erent consumer expectations and how they determine market equilibrium.
We …nd that consumer expectations (varying from weak, = 1, to strong, = 0) together with product di¤erentiation and network e¤ects (both captured by the ratio := t=b) jointly determine the nature of competition and market performance. As a rule, the price-sensitivity of demand declines when consumer expectations become more stubborn. We analyze the following market features: i) intensity of competition, ii) multiple equilibria, iii) preferences for (de facto) standardization, 4 and …nally, iv) preferences for compatibility.
The following results emerge from our analysis: i) The intensity of competition (which is inversely proportional to price levels) increases when network e¤ects increase and/or product 3 See also the textbook exposition in Shy (2001) . 4 The literature distinguishes between de facto and de jure standardization (David and Greenstein 1990) .
The former is achieved through the market mechanism and the latter is the result of committee agreement or governmental intervention. We focus on de facto standardization which emerges as a monopoly equilibrium outcome in our model. di¤erentiation decreases. Moreover, competition is more intense when expectations become less stubborn. Intuitively, when expectations are less stubborn, then consumers are more eager to take into account the positive demand e¤ects induced by a price reduction.
ii) Multiple equilibria are an issue when production di¤erentiation is small and/or network e¤ects are large. In those instances, both a duopoly equilibrium and (multiple) monopoly equilibria are possible. Overall, an increase in the degree of stubbornness tends to decrease the parameter range where many equilibria exist, while the parameter range with a unique (duopoly) equilibrium becomes larger. When product di¤erentiation becomes su¢ ciently large, a unique (duopoly) equilibrium survives for any type of consumer expectations.
iii) We analyze preferences for standardization by comparing consumer surplus and social welfare in the monopoly equilibria with those in the duopoly equilibrium. Social welfare is always largest in the monopoly equilibria (if they exist). Consumers tend to favor the duopoly equilibrium over the monopoly equilibria when product di¤erentiation is low, network e¤ects are large, and expectations are weak. Hence, in the latter case consumer and social preferences regarding standardization are not aligned. However, as consumer expectations become more stubborn, price competition is reduced in the duopoly equilibrium which tends to make consumers relatively better o¤ when de facto standardization is realized.
iv) Preferences for compatibility are driven by the di¤erences in consumer surplus and social welfare with incompatible and compatible products. If products are compatible, then a unique duopoly equilibrium exists where both products provide the same amount of network e¤ects.
From a social welfare point of view, compatibility is always better than incompatibility because of large network e¤ects and preserved product variety. 5 However, when consumer expectations are su¢ ciently weak and/or product di¤erentiation is relatively low (or, network e¤ects are relatively high), then consumers prefer products to be incompatible because of lower prices (both in the duopoly and monopoly equilibria). In that case, a consumer surplus standard and a social welfare standard lead to contradicting views concerning the desirability of compatibility.
The advantage of lower prices under incompatibility becomes less pronounced as stubbornness increases. In that sense, stubbornness tends to reduce the con ‡ict between both welfare concepts.
Our analysis of network e¤ects within a Hotelling model is most closely related to Grilo, 5 We abstract from possible costs to implement compatibility. Shy, and Thisse (2001; henceforth: GST) . That paper considers only the weak expectations case. GST's contribution is to analyze strong network e¤ects (termed as "strong conformity"),
where they use the invariance axiom to reduce the set of multiple equilibria. We apply this technique to solve the case of weak expectations what yields qualitatively the same results as in GST. In the course of our analysis of the mixed expectations case, we …nd that the invariance axiom is also applicable here. There are several di¤erences between GST and our analysis: First, GST do not model consumer expectations explicitly and, therefore, neither consider strong expectations nor mixed expectations. Second, and relatedly, we focus on the comparison of weak, strong, and mixed expectations, and we show how di¤erent types of expectations a¤ect market outcomes. Third, we analyze the market outcome when products are compatible and we compare that outcome with the equilibria under incompatibility. Fourth, in GST both the network e¤ects function and the transportation costs function are quadratic, while we suppose linear speci…cations.
Our analysis of the role of consumer expectations complements the (largely informal) analysis in Farrell and Katz (1998) who examine how consumer expectations a¤ect …rms'compatibility and innovation incentives. 6 They distinguish between expectations which "track surplus" or "stubbornly favor one …rm". 7, 8 Expectations that track surplus induce consumers to expect the …rm to win the market which provides the highest surplus (holding network size constant).
Expectations stubbornly favor one …rm if consumers expect a particular …rm to dominate the market independently of quality and price. Those expectations only make sense when consumers agree which product is preferable. Our analysis is di¤erent, because we distinguish between weak and strong expectations in the context of di¤erentiated products, where consumers should have a natural preference for the product which is "closest"in the product-characteristic space.
However, our analysis is complementary to Farrell and Katz (1998) as we make the gametheoretic speci…cations explicit, which induce weak or strong expectations. 6 R&D incentives in markets with network e¤ects have also been analyzed in Kristiansen and Thum (1997) and Glazer, Kanniainen, and Mustonen (2006) when consumer expecations are weak. 7 The authors also consider expectations which "track quality"; a case which refers to vertical product di¤erentiation.
We proceed as follows. In Section 2 we present the model. In Section 3 we analyze both polar cases of strong and weak expectations and the mixed case in which consumers hold partially stubborn expectations. In Section 4 we analyze …rms'compatibility incentives as well as social and consumer preferences for compatibility. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
The Model
We analyze a duopoly where …rms o¤er di¤erentiated products which exhibit positive network e¤ects. We suppose a Hotelling duopoly model with a unit mass of consumers uniformly distributed on the interval [0; 1]. Each consumer is indexed by x 2 [0; 1] indicating the ideal point in the product-characteristic space. We suppose two …rms i = A; B each o¤ering one product at price p i . Firm A's product is located at x = 0 and …rm B's product is located at x = 1. Each consumer buys at most one unit of one of the two products o¤ered in the market.
We assume that both …rms produce under the same cost conditions. We set production costs to zero. Firms set their prices p i independently and simultaneously. Consumer utility is increasing in network size with slope b > 0. The network size associated with product i is determined by the total number of compatible products sold in the market. 9 When both products are incompatible, the utility a consumer with address x 2 [0; 1] derives from product
where A denotes …rm A's market share, v is the stand-alone value of the product, and t is the "transportation" cost rate. Accordingly, the utility from purchasing product B is given by
where B stands for …rm B's market share. We assume that the stand-alone value v is su¢ ciently large such that the market is always covered in equilibrium; i.e., A + B = 1 holds. Hence, the total quantity of product i sold in the market is equal to its market share, i . Accordingly, product i's market share, i , multiplied by the network e¤ects parameter, b, gives the total network e¤ects associated with the consumption of product i. 9 Products of a single …rm are always compatible with each other.
When …rms'products are compatible, the utility from product i is given by U (p i ; 1) such that network e¤ects are always at their maximum level (we analyze compatible products in Section 4).
Consumers make their buying decisions simultaneously and independently. Consumers form expectations about …rms'market shares which are the result of consumers'purchasing decisions.
We consider two polar cases of expectation formation: strong expectations and weak expectations (below we also examine the "mixed"case). We model both cases of consumer expectations by adjusting the timing of our game. When expectations are weak, consumers form their expectations after prices have been set. In contrast, if expectations are strong, then consumers determine their expectations before …rms set prices.
We now de…ne the equilibrium concepts. First, consider the case of strong expectations. In the …rst stage of the game, consumers form expectations about each …rm's market share, e i , for i = A; B. In the second stage, …rms set prices to maximize their pro…ts. Finally, in the third stage, consumers make their purchasing decisions. Consumer demand for product i is then a function of …rms' prices and consumers' (strong) expectations. 10 We write the corresponding demand function as q(p i ; p j; e i ) (we derive the demand function in the next section). We solve the strong expectations game for ful…lled expectations Nash equilibria. In such an equilibrium each …rm's price maximizes its pro…t i (p i ; p j ; e i ) := p i q(p i ; p j; e i ) for a given price of the rival and given consumer expectations. Moreover, consumer expectations are ful…lled;
i.e., each …rm's equilibrium market share is equal to the expected market share. The following de…nition summarizes these considerations (the superscript "SE"stands for strong expectations and indicates equilibrium values). 
De…nition 1 (Strong Expectations
We use the Nash equilibrium concept to solve the weak expectations case. 11 In the …rst stage, …rms choose simultaneously and noncooperatively their prices. In the second stage, consumers make their purchasing decisions, where each consumer chooses the product which maximizes his utility (given …rms'prices and the choices of the other consumers). We denote the corresponding demand function by q(p i ; p j ). 12 The following de…nition states the Nash equilibrium for the weak expectations case (the superscript "W E" indicates the equilibrium values). 
De…nition 2 (Weak Expectations
Evaluating the demand at the equilibrium prices gives
We solve the mixed case where consumer expectations are partially stubborn by combining De…nitions 1 and 2.
Analysis and Main Results
We …rst analyze both polar cases where consumers hold either strong expectations or weak expectations. We then turn to the setting in which consumers are partially stubborn so that expectations are a hybrid of strong and weak expectations. Finally, we compare our results.
1 1 This approach was adopted in Farrell and Saloner (1992) , Baake and Boom (2001) , and Grilo, Shy, and Thisse (2001) . 1 2 Note that consumer expectations do not enter the demand function.
Strong Expectations
We assume that consumers form expectations before observing …rms' prices, while …rms set prices given consumer expectations. Consumers make their purchasing decisions based on …rms' expected market shares and their prices. Substituting the expected market shares e i into the utilities (1) and (2), it is straightforward to obtain the demand for product i as
with i; j = A; B and i 6 = j. Notice, the demand function (3) depends on the initially formed strong expectations.
For the exposition of the subsequent analysis it is convenient to de…ne the ratio of the product di¤erentiation parameter to the network e¤ects parameter by := t=b, with 2 (0; 1). The ratio is high (low) if product di¤erentiation is large (low) and/or network e¤ects are small (large).
We start with the duopoly equilibrium, in which both …rms share the market. Maximization We turn now to the monopoly equilibria, where one …rm i becomes the monopolist. In this equilibrium prices are given by p m;SE i = b(1 ) and p m;SE j = 0, where the superscript "m"stands for the monopoly equilibrium. That is, …rm i monopolizes the market with p m;SE
and …rm j cannot do better than charging the lowest possible price p m;SE j = 0. Those prices constitute an equilibrium only if …rm i does not have a unilateral incentive to increase its price, which requires
Evaluating Condition (4), we obtain the parameter restriction 1=3. We summarize our results as follows. 13 Proposition 1. Suppose products are incompatible and consumers hold strong expectations.
Then there exists a unique duopoly equilibrium, in which each …rm i sets the price p d;SE i = b
and serves half of the market. If network e¤ ects are su¢ ciently large (i.e., 1=3 holds), then two monopoly equilibria also exist, where …rm i gains the entire market and sets the price
, while the rival …rm cannot do better than setting p m;SE j = 0 ( i; j = A; B and i 6 = j).
If network e¤ects are relatively weak (or, conversely, products are su¢ ciently di¤erentiated), then only the duopoly equilibrium exists (i.e., if > 1=3 holds). For larger network e¤ects (or, rather homogeneous products, i.e., if 1=3) two additional monopoly equilibria exist. In the monopoly equilibrium one …rm gains the entire market with a "limit" price. This price makes the consumer at the other end of the Hotelling line indi¤erent between buying the monopolist's product (involving a disutility of t but giving rise to network utility b) or the rival …rm's product which is o¤ered at a price of zero (though lacking any network utility).
From Proposition 1 it follows that the winning …rm in the monopoly equilibrium makes a higher pro…t than in the duopoly equilibrium. 14, 15 This result reveals how crucial expectations and network e¤ects are for …rms'behavior and their performance. If consumers expect a …rm to become a monopolist, that …rm gains the entire market with a price which is higher than the price an undercutting …rm would have to charge in order to gain the entire market if consumers are expecting the duopoly outcome. 16 1 3 In the following we ignore the non-generic case = 1.
1 4 Comparison of the duopoly pro…t, d;SE = b =2, with the monopoly pro…t, m;SE = b(1 ), gives m;SE > d;SE for all k 1=3 (which is the parameter region where both equilibria exist).
1 5 It is noteworthy that the reasoning of d 'Aspremont, Gabszewicz, and Thisse (1979) regarding the non-existence of an (interior) duopoly equilibrium does not apply to our model with network e¤ects. That paper shows within a linear Hotelling model that an equilibrium does not exist when the monopolization of the market leads to a higher pro…t than the pro…t in the (interior) duopoly equilibrium.
1 6 This reasoning is not speci…c to the case of strong expectations. Below we show that it carries over to the weak expectations case. However, as consumers do not revise their expectations to actually charged prices the e¤ect is more pronounced under strong expectations. As a consequence, the parameter region where the monopoly
Weak Expectations
We solve the case of weak expectations for standard Nash equilibria: every consumer conditions his purchasing decisions on …rms' prices and the decisions of the other consumers which give rise to market shares A and B for products A and B, respectively. Hence, the utility of a consumer located at x from purchasing good i is given by (1) if he buys product A and by (2) if he buys product B. Each consumer chooses in the second stage the product that yields the highest utility for him, given prices and the other consumers' choices (i.e., A and B ). As each consumer is in…nitesimal, his own choice does not a¤ect market shares. The equilibrium demand q(p A ; p B ) is then derived from noticing that the consumer with address x = q(p A ; p B ) is indi¤erent between product A and product B, when prices are p A and p B and the market share
In the following we distinguish between two cases: i) small network e¤ects with > 1 and ii) large networks e¤ects with < 1. Solving for the Nash equilibria we derive the following result. If network e¤ ects are small or, alternatively, product di¤ erentiation is large (i.e., > 1 holds), then a unique (duopoly) equilibrium exists, in which each …rm i sets the price p d;W E i = b( 1) and obtains half of the market.
Proof. Assume …rst > 1. Comparing consumers'utilities (1) and (2) 
Using symmetry yields …rm B's demand. We start with the duopoly equilibrium. Maximization of …rms' pro…ts yields the …rst-order conditions
which give rise to equilibrium prices
. We now rule out monopoly equilibria (we indicate candidate equilibrium values with an asterisk). In the monopoly equilibrium with
The latter condition implies that …rm j must set a positive price. Hence, it always has an opportunity to pro…tably undercut and there can be no monopoly Nash equilibrium.
Assume now < 1. The demand for …rm i's product then becomes
Note that for prices in the interval (b t) p j p i b t, the demand can take three di¤erent values, which implies that q(p i ; p j ) is a demand correspondence. Note also that the demand
, is increasing in p i . With large network e¤ects multiple Nash equilibria are possible. At this point we refer to GST who showed in their setting that the invariance axiom implies that one …rm must set a price of zero in the monopoly equilibrium, while both …rms set their prices equal to zero in the duopoly equilibrium. We, therefore, obtain the types of equilibria stated in parts i) and ii) of the proposition. 18 We illustrate the invariance axiom by showing that there exist no equilibria with p i ; p j > 0.
Given a pair of prices and the associated market equilibrium, the invariance axiom requires the following: If both …rms increase their prices by the same amount, then the new prices must induce an equilibrium in which …rms'market shares remain constant (provided that the market is covered). First note that equilibrium prices must satisfy (b t) p i p j b t. Indeed, assume that p i p j > b t, in which case i = 0, so that …rm i always …nds it optimal to decrease its price to get a positive market share. If p i p j < (b t), then …rm j has the same incentive to deviate. Hence, the only case which remains is (b t) p i p j b t. In that case demand for …rm i can take three di¤erent values: i = 0, i = 1 and i = I i :
Assume …rst that p i ; p j > 0 and I i constitute an equilibrium outcome. We show that such an equilibrium does not satisfy the invariance axiom. For p i ; p j > 0 and I i to be an equilibrium any price pair (p i ; p j ) with p i > p i must induce i = 0, as otherwise …rm i can increase both its price and quantity (note that I i increases in p i ). It then follows from the invariance axiom that any price pair above the line p i = p i p j + p j (the line with slope 1 passing through the point (p i ; p j )) must also induce i = 0. But then …rm j can increase its pro…t by slightly lowering its price (given that p i = p i , only price pairs (p i ; p j ) with p j < p j lie in the region where i = 0). Hence, p i ; p j > 0 and I i cannot constitute an equilibrium outcome under the invariance axiom. Assume now that p i ; p j > 0 and i = 1 describe an equilibrium outcome. Then any price pair (p i ; p j ) with p j 6 = p j must induce i = 1, as otherwise …rm j can increase its pro…t by unilaterally changing its price. The invariance axiom implies then that any price pair above the line p i = p i p j + p j must also induce i = 1. But then, …rm i can instead increase its pro…t by increasing its price. We can use a similar argument to prove that p i ; p j > 0 and i = 0 cannot constitute an equilibrium. Q.E.D.
Proposition 2 states that multiple Nash equilibria exist when network e¤ects are large. In that case duopoly and monopoly equilibria are possible. In the duopoly equilibrium both …rms compete away all pro…ts and set prices equal to zero. In the monopoly equilibria the monopolist may set a price up to b(1 ), while the competitor cannot do better than setting always its price to zero.
Mixed Expectations
We now assume that each consumer neither holds purely strong nor entirely weak expectations.
Instead, we suppose that consumer expectations are a hybrid of weak expectations and strong expectations weighted by and 1 , respectively. We interpret 1 as the degree of stubbornness of consumer expectations. That is, with probability 1 a consumer forms his expectations before …rms set prices and with counter probability his expectations are adjusted after …rms have set prices. All consumers are homogeneous with regard to the degree of stubbornness. 19 We can integrate the degree of stubbornness into the formulation of consumers'utilities (1) and (2). The utility of a consumer with address x from purchasing good A can then be written
and, accordingly, the utility from buying product B as
As consumers'purchasing decisions are in ‡uenced by strong expectations, e i , a …rm's demand in the mixed case, q(p i ; p j ; e i ; ), is a function of …rms'prices, consumers'strong expectations, and the degree of stubbornness. Firms' demands must be such that a consumer with address
is indi¤erent between products A and B when …rm A's market share is
, …rms'prices are p A and p B , and with probability 1 consumers expect …rm A (B) to hold a market share e A (1 e A ). We solve for the ful…lled expectations Nash equilibria such that stubborn expectations, e A , are ful…lled in equilibrium. In the following we distinguish between two cases: i) small network e¤ects with > and ii) large networks e¤ects with < . 20 Assume …rst that network e¤ects are small ( > ). Comparing the utilities (7) and (8) yields …rm i's demand q(p i ; p j ; e i ; ) = 8 > > > < > > > :
1 9 In the Appendix we present an alternative interpretation of the mixed expectations case which gives rise to the same results (we thank an anonymous referee for that suggestion). Precisely, suppose two types of consumers, one holding strong expectations and the other one holding weak expectations. Consumers of both types are uniformly distributed on the unit interval. The mass of consumers with weak expectations is , while that of consumers with strong expectations is 1 . Again, we can then interpret 1 as measuring the degree of stubbornness in the market.
2 0 We do not consider the non-generic case = .
with ( e i ; ) := 2(1 )(1 e i ) 1 and ( e i ; ) := 1 2(1 ) e i . We start with the duopoly equilibrium. Maximization of …rms' pro…ts yields prices p i ( e i ) = t b + (1 )b(2 e i 1)=3. Imposing the ful…lled Nash equilibrium condition that consumers' strong expectations are ful…lled, we obtain the equilibrium prices and market shares given by p We now turn to the monopoly equilibria where one …rm i (i = A; B) becomes the monopolist.
In such an equilibrium it must hold that e i = 1 and p j = 0 (i 6 = j) as otherwise …rm j can pro…tably undercut. Hence, p i must satisfy p i b(1 ), which implies 1. Moreover, …rm i must not have an incentive to increase its price, which requires (1 + 2 )=3. The latter condition is more restrictive than 1. Hence, if < (1 + 2 )=3, then two monopoly equilibria exist.
Assume next that 0 < < , so that network e¤ects are large. Firm i's demand is then given by q(p i ; p j ; e i ; ) = 8 > > > < > > > :
Note that …rm i's demand is a correspondence for any e i 2 [0; 1] as it can take three possible values in the intermediate interval. Indeed, requiring that b ( e i ; ) t > b ( e i ; ) + t, we obtain the condition < , which holds by assuming large network e¤ects. In equilibrium, either one …rm gains the whole market or shares it with the rival. Moreover, expectations must be ful…lled. We …rst consider the case where …rm i gains the whole market with e i = m;M E i = 1. 21 The monopoly outcome q(p i ; p j ; 1; ) = 1 can only constitute an equilibrium if …rm j sets a price of zero, while …rm i sets any non-negative price up to the "limit" price, which is
Hence, we get the monopoly equilibria with As expectations must be ful…lled, we obtain from the demand (10) From Proposition 3 we observe that both polar cases of strong and weak expectations recur as special cases under mixed expectations. If = 0, parts ii) and iii) of Proposition 3 reiterate the message of Proposition 1. 22 If = 1, parts i) and iii) of Proposition 3 state the same equilibria as Proposition 2. 23 We infer from Proposition 3 that multiple equilibria become less likely when stubbornness (i.e., 1 ) increases. An increase in 1 makes the parameter range which yields a unique equilibrium ( > (1 + 2 )=3) as well as the parameter range with a duopoly and two monopoly equilibria ( < (1 + 2 )=3) larger. Conversely, the interval with in…nitely many equilibria ( < ) becomes smaller with increasing stubbornness. Moreover, the impact of a change in is more pronounced the larger network e¤ects become. If network e¤ects are su¢ ciently small (with > 1 holding), a unique equilibrium emerges for any value of .
It also follows from Proposition 3 that equilibrium prices cannot increase when expectations become less stubborn (i.e., increases). This result is straightforward for the monopoly equilibria and the duopoly equilibrium when network e¤ects are large ( < ), where prices do not depend on . Given that network e¤ects are su¢ ciently large ( > ), duopoly equilibrium prices,
), monotonically decrease in . Moreover, prices decrease faster when network e¤ects are large. The relative change in prices is also larger, the smaller product di¤erentiation becomes.
To understand these relationships, we consider the derivative of the demand function (9) in the intermediate interval with respect to p i which gives
The right-hand side of (11) is decreasing in provided that < . Hence, if the indi¤erent consumers is located in the open interval (0; 1), the demand function becomes more pricesensitive when expectations become weaker (i.e., increases). Consumers with relatively weak expectations are more eager to take into account the positive demand e¤ect of a price reduction.
That in turn, intensi…es price competition leading to lower prices in equilibrium.
Analyzing the dependence of equilibrium prices on the ratio , we observe that in the duopoly equilibrium prices decrease when network e¤ects become larger or/and product di¤erentiation becomes less intense. When > , the prices p d;M E i = b( ) monotonically decrease in b.
If < , the equilibrium prices in the duopoly equilibrium do not respond to changes in b and remain at the lowest possible level of zero. The intuition for this result can be again inferred from inspecting the derivative (11) . For a given level of stubbornness, consumers react more to changes in …rms'prices when network e¤ects are large. 24
However, the impact of network e¤ects on the monopolist's price in the monopoly equilibrium Taking the level of prices in the duopoly equilibrium as an inverse measure of competition, the following corollary follows directly.
Corollary 1. If the degree of stubbornness and/or network e¤ ects increase, then the intensity of competition increases as well.
Comparison of Results
We now turn to the comparison of social welfare and consumer surplus under the two types of equilibria (duopoly and monopoly). We use our results for the mixed expectations case which nests the weak and strong expectations scenarios as special cases. In the following we drop the superscript indicating the mixed expectations case. Consumer surplus and social welfare in the duopoly equilibrium are given by
For the monopoly equilibrium we obtain the corresponding values 
*For < , the monopoly equilibrium exists if and only if (3 1)=2 and < 1. Corollary 2 states that social welfare is always maximized in the monopoly equilibrium; i.e., when the market mechanism achieves de facto standardization. The result becomes intuitive, if we recall from Proposition 3 that the monopoly equilibrium only emerges when product di¤erentiation is relatively small or network e¤ects are large enough (i.e., when ful…lls <
(1 + 2 )=3 or < ). Those restrictions make the monopoly equilibrium socially attractive as the costs of less product variety are kept small relative to the bene…ts from maximum network e¤ects.
Consumer preferences for the type of equilibrium critically depend on the prevailing prices which mirror the underlying fundamentals. Consider …rst the case of relatively small network e¤ects (see part i) of Corollary 2, where > holds). The price in the duopoly equilibrium decreases when expectations become more price-sensitive leaving more of the network bene…ts to consumers. That sharply contrasts with the monopoly equilibrium, which allows the monopolist to extract all of the network bene…ts with a price of b(1 ). Hence, in the assumed parameter region, consumers are more likely to prefer the duopoly equilibrium when both network e¤ects and the price-sensitivity of demand are su¢ ciently large. Hence, it is necessary that expectations are su¢ ciently weak (i.e., price-sensitive) such that consumers …nd the duopoly equilibrium more attractive than the monopoly outcome.
Moreover, increasing the signi…cance of product di¤erentiation, t, makes the monopoly equilibrium more attractive for consumers as the monopolist reduces its price by t to keep the rival …rm out. Hence, if product di¤erentiation becomes large enough, consumer preferences are aligned with social preferences.
Consider, …nally, the case when network e¤ects are large (see part ii) of Corollary 2, where < holds). In the duopoly equilibrium consumers enjoy zero prices, while the monopolist may be able to set a strictly positive price. Clearly, consumers then favor the monopoly equilibrium when the monopolist sets the most competitive price. If, to the contrary, the least competitive price prevails in the monopoly equilibrium, then consumer preferences, again, depend on the signi…cance of product di¤erentiation. When products are su¢ ciently di¤erentiated ( 2=3), then consumers are better o¤ in the monopoly equilibrium, in which the monopolist extracts all the network e¤ects but reduces his price by t to drive out the rival …rm. When product di¤erentiation is relatively small ( < 2=3), then the con ‡ict between consumer surplus and social welfare emerges again.
Comparing social preferences for de facto standardization with consumer preferences, we can identify instances of alignment and con ‡ict. Social and consumer preferences are most likely to be aligned when product di¤erentiation is large enough or network e¤ects play only a minor role (i.e., 2=3 holds). In particular, if the monopolist sets the highest possible price (see part ii)
of Corollary 2), then any potential for con ‡ict vanishes (given 2=3 holds).
If, however, network e¤ects become more important or product di¤erentiation less pronounced (such that < 2=3 becomes true), we observe that the con ‡ict between a social welfare and a consumer surplus standard becomes more likely the less stubborn consumer expectations become. Part ii) of Corollary 2 shows that the con ‡ict is ubiquitous when expectations are highly price-sensitive (i.e., > ) and the least competitive monopoly equilibrium emerges.
Similarly, Part i) reveals that consumers favor a duopoly equilibrium even for relatively stubborn expectations (i.e., < holds) when product di¤erentiation is small enough relative to network e¤ects (i.e., < 2=3 holds).
Our result that consumers may prefer a socially ine¢ cient market outcome is related to Farrell and Saloner (1992) who argued that the existence of (imperfect) converters makes a standardization outcome less likely, so that overall incompatibilities tend to be larger with converters. They interpret their …nding as an ine¢ ciency due to the irresponsibility of competition.
In those instances, "[i]t might be better if some good were not o¤ered at all, or were o¤ered only at a high price, because consumers use it 'irresponsibly'; but with competition, no agent can decide that a good will not be o¤ered, or that its price shall be high" (Farrell and Saloner 1992, p. 13 ).
Compatibility: Incentives and Welfare
We now allow for the option to make the products of both …rms compatible. The utility from consuming the product of …rm i = A; B is then given by U i x (p i ; 1). When products are compatible, the amount of network e¤ects provided by any …rm is …xed at b. Hence, consumer expectations are irrelevant for their purchasing choices. The following proposition states the Nash equilibrium when products are compatible (equilibrium values are marked by "c"). A; B) , serves half of the market and realizes the pro…t c i = bk=2. Consumer surplus and social welfare are given by CS c = v + b(1 5 =4) and
Proof. We consider …rst the duopoly equilibrium, where each …rm i maximizes its pro…t [1=2 + (p j p i )=2t]p i for a given price of the competitor (i; j = A; B, i 6 = j). Maximization of …rms'pro…ts yields prices p c i = b (i = A; B) and equal market shares. Consumer surplus and social welfare are given by
We prove now that there are no monopoly equilibria under compatibility. Assume, to the contrary, that …rm A holds a monopoly position. Then it must hold that U A x=1 (p A ; 1) = U B x=1 (p B ; 1) for A to gain the whole market. It must also hold that p B = 0 as otherwise …rm B could pro…tably undercut. Combining the two equalities we get p A = t; an outcome obviously not admissible. Q.E.D.
Comparing Proposition 4 with our previous results in Section 3, we obtain the following corollary regarding …rms'compatibility incentives.
Corollary 3. If under incompatibility the duopoly equilibrium emerges, then …rms prefer compatibility for any 0 1. If the monopoly equilibrium emerges in which the monopolist sets a price of zero, then again, …rms have strict incentives for compatibility. If in the monopoly equilibrium the monopolist sets the highest possible price, then …rms'incentives for compatibility depend on as well as on the fact whether side payments are feasible or not:
i) with side payments, …rms have incentives for compatibility if 1=2,
ii) without side payments, …rms have incentives for compatibility if 2=3.
If under compatibility the duopoly equilibrium emerges, then …rms always have incentives for compatibility. The reason lies in the intensity of price competition. Under compatibility the amount of network e¤ects (b) associated with each product is …xed and, therefore, independent of …rms'pricing decisions. Under incompatibility, by decreasing its prices a …rm also increases the amount of its network e¤ects. Hence, under incompatibility demand is more price-elastic which intensi…es competition. This result is in line with Shy (2001, p. 31) who states that competition is relaxed under compatibility "since under compatibility …rms'network size becomes irrelevant to consumers'choice of which brand to buy."
Interestingly, Shy rules out monopoly equilibria under incompatibility. Ruling out monopoly equilibria requires to restrict the analysis to instances where network e¤ects are relatively small (when compared with the signi…cance of product di¤erentiation). Yet, our comparison reveals that those instances are critical. Exactly for large network e¤ects common wisdom may be overturned. Precisely, if the monopolist sets the highest possible price of b(1 ), then incentives for compatibility disappear. The intuition for a cut-o¤ level can be inferred simply by noting that the monopolist's price b(1 ) decreases while the price under compatibility increases when product di¤erentiation becomes more pronounced. Interestingly, Corollary 3 also reveals that the possibility of side-payments does not a¤ect the …nding qualitatively that …rms may prefer incompatible products.
If, however, the monopolist sets the most competitive price of zero in the monopoly equilibrium under incompatibility, then we are left with the well-known conclusion that …rms have strict incentives for compatibility.
Finally, we analyze whether social and consumer preferences for compatibility are aligned or whether they contradict each other. We state our results as follows. 
Social welfare is always highest under compatibility which maximizes network e¤ects. As both …rms share the market under compatibility, there is also no reduction in product variety.
Consumer preferences for compatibility depend on expectations, product di¤erentiation, and network e¤ects. If network e¤ects are relatively small (i.e., > holds), then consumers enjoy lower prices in the duopoly equilibrium for su¢ ciently price-sensitive expectations. With 1=2
consumers are better-o¤ in the duopoly equilibrium compared to compatibility. Interestingly, at = 1=2 the negative e¤ect of lower network e¤ects and the positive e¤ect of lower prices are exactly balanced, which yields indi¤erence. Consumers also prefer the monopoly equilibrium compared to compatibility when product di¤erentiation is strong enough relative to network e¤ects. In the monopoly equilibrium the monopolist decreases his price by t to monopolize the market and consumer surplus in the monopoly equilibrium increases in . In contrast, consumer surplus under compatibility decreases in .
When network e¤ects are relatively large (i.e., < holds), then prices under incompatibility do not depend on anymore. When the monopolist sets a price of zero, consumers prefer the monopoly equilibrium when compared with compatibility. If the monopolist sets the highest possible price of b(1 ), then the comparison is same as in the case with a low value of .
When product di¤erentiation is signi…cant, consumers prefer the duopoly equilibrium where they enjoy prices of zero while under compatibility they must pay a price of b .
The alignment of consumer and social preferences for compatibility, therefore, depends both on and . When and are high enough, consumers enjoy low enough prices under incompatibility which may make both the duopoly and monopoly equilibria more attractive than the equilibrium under compatibility. Hence, a con ‡ict between consumer and social preferences for compatibility may then follow.
Conclusions
We examined a duopoly model where …rms o¤er (horizontally) di¤erentiated products that exhibit positive network e¤ects. We focused on the role expectations play as a determinant of market conduct and market performance. Consumers form expectations about …rms' market shares and may hold weak, strong, or mixed expectations. We assumed that strong (or, stubborn) expectations are determined before …rms compete in prices. Under weak expectations consumers fully take account of …rms'pricing decisions, while mixed expectations combine both properties.
We showed that the formation of expectations has a real impact on competition and market performance. A key insight of our analysis is that more price-sensitive (or, equivalently, less stubborn) expectations induce more competitive pricing and, with that, lower prices. The impact of consumer expectations on competition is reinforced when network e¤ects increase and/or product di¤erentiation is reduced. That …nding has important consequences for market behavior and market outcomes in markets with network e¤ects as well as for the desirability of de facto standardization and compatibility. More price-sensitive expectations tend to evoke a con ‡ict between social and consumer preferences with regard to de facto standardization (i.e., the choice between the duopoly and the monopoly equilibria). Similarly, less stubborn expectations make a con ‡ict between consumer and social preferences for compatibility more likely. Both types of con ‡icts tend to become more pronounced when product di¤erentiation vanishes or network e¤ects increase.
There are many routes for further research. One way could be to introduce vertical product di¤erentiation and to analyze …rms'incentives to raise product quality depending on consumer expectations. As expectations (weak, strong, or mixed) a¤ect both the marginal pro…tability of investments and the level of pro…ts, interesting trade-o¤s may emerge. Finally, another route may be to learn more about the behavioral causes which drive the degree of consumer stubbornness.
Appendix
In this Appendix we provide an alternative interpretation of the mixed expectations speci…cation we presented in Section 3. We now assume that there are two types of consumers with opposite forms of expectations. One type only holds strong expectations and the other type has weak expectations. Consumers of both types are uniformly distributed on the unit interval. The mass of consumers with weak expectations is and that of consumers with strong expectations is 1 . Again, we can interpret 1 as measuring the degree of stubbornness in the market.
The next proposition shows that Proposition 3 remains valid under this alternative speci…cation (we restrict attention to parameters > ).
Proposition A1. Assume that consumers are of two di¤ erent types, one type of mass holding weak expectations and the other type of mass 1 holding strong expectations. Suppose also > . Depending on and exactly the same equilibria emerge as stated in parts ii) and iii)
of Proposition 3.
Proof. We …rst derive the total demand, q( ), which is the sum of the demands of the weak and the strong expectation types; i.e., q( ) = q ( )+q ! ( ), where we use the superscripts " "and "!" for indicating the strong and the weak expectation types, respectively. Consider …rst consumers with strong expectations. If prices are not too di¤erent, then we can de…ne a marginal consumer with address x (p A ; p B ; e A ) who is indi¤erent between both …rms'products; namely
On the interval x 2 [0; x (p A ; p B ; e A )] the share of consumers with strong expectations is 1 , hence, the demand for …rm A's products from strong-type consumers is (1 )x (p A ; p B ; e A ), while that for …rm B's products is (1 )x (p B ; p A ; e B ) (again, whenever prices are not too di¤erent). Inspecting all possible price constellations, we obtain …rm i's demand from consumers with strong expectations as q (p i ; p j ; e i ; ) = 8 > > > > < > > > > :
Let us now turn to the consumers with weak expectations. Provided that prices are not too di¤erent, there exists a marginal consumer with address x ! (p A ; p B ; e A ; ) who is indi¤erent between both …rms'products. Straightforward calculations then give
A consumer with weak expectations expects …rm i's market share to be q ( ) + q ! ( ), where …rm i's demand from consumers with weak expectations is q ! ( ) = x ! (p i ; p j ; e i ; ) (whenever …rms' prices are not too di¤erent). To derive the demand from consumers with weak expectations we have to consider the di¤erent price intervals as stated in (12) .
We start with the …rst interval of (12) , which requires p j p i b(1 2 e i ) + t, such that 1) . Note that for any e i it holds that p j +b(1 ) p j +b(2 e i 1 ). Hence, if p j p i b(1 2 e i )+t, then q ! ( ) = . We now show that the demand from consumers with weak expectations cannot take other values. It holds that implies that q ! ( ) = 0 is not possible. We …nally analyze whether q ! ( ) can take any values on the interval (0; ). If > , then 0 < q ! ( ) < provided that b(1 )+2b( 1) < p j p i < b( 1).
Under the condition > it holds that p j + 2b(1 ) + b( 1) > p j + b(2 e i 1 ), which implies that 0 < q ! ( ) < is not possible.
We next consider the third interval of (12), where p j p i b (1 2 e i ) t with q ( ) = 0. Which values can q ! ( ) take on this interval? Note if q ( ) = 0, then q ! ( ) = 0 follows, if
For any e i it holds that p j b(1 ) p j b (1 2 e i ) + t, which implies that q ! ( ) = 0. We now show that the demand from consumers with weak expectations cannot take any other value. If q ( ) = 0, then q ! ( ) = follows, if p j p i 2b(
, which implies that q ! ( ) = is not possible. There are also no values of q ! ( ) on the interval (0; ).
Provided that > , this is only possible if prices satisfy b(1 ) < p j p i < b(1 )+2b( ).
As b (1 2 e i ) t < b(1 ), q ! ( ) cannot take any values on the interval (0; ).
We …nally consider the intermediate interval of (12), where b (1 2 e i ) t < p j p i < b(1 2 e i ) + t holds, such that q ( ) 2 (0; 1 ). What values can q ! ( ) take on this interval?
As > , it holds that q ! ( ) = if In a similar way we get that b (1 2 e i ) t < b ( )= (1 + ) b (1 ) (2 e i 1)=(1+ ) and b ( )= (1 + ) b (1 ) (2 e i 1)=(1 + ) b(1 2 e i ) + t, with equality holding for e i = 1. Hence, it follows that 0 q ! ( ) .
Taking those results together, we can state …rm i's demand from consumers with both weak and strong expectations as q(p i ; p j ; e i ; ) = q (p i ; p j ; e i ; ) + q ! (p i ; p j ; e i ; ) = 8 > > > > > > > > > > < > > > > > > > > > > :
(1 )(2 e i 1) 1+ (1 )t+b(1 )(2 e i 1)+(1 )(p j p i ) 2t
where p := p j p i .
We now turn to the equilibrium analysis. Inspecting the intervals of the market demand, we observe that the second interval and the fourth interval are symmetric as well as the …rst interval and the …fth interval. We can, therefore, con…ne our analysis to the …rst three intervals.
We start with the …rst interval where prices ful…ll p j p i b(1 2 e i )+t. In this interval …rm i gets all the consumers (both strong-type and weak-type consumers). Hence, for expectations to be ful…lled it must hold that e i = 1. Note, if e i = 1, then b(1 2 e i ) + t = b ( ) 1 + b (1 ) (2 e i 1) 1 + follows, so that …rm i's demand takes the form q(p i ; p j ; 1; ) = q (p i ; p j ; 1; ) + q ! (p i ; p j ; 1; ) = 8 > > > > > > > < > > > > > > > :
By decreasing its price …rm i cannot further increase its demand. Hence, in equilibrium it must hold that p j p i = b + t. Moreover, it must hold that p j = 0. Otherwise, …rm j could increase its pro…t by decreasing its price. Firm i must not have an incentive to increase its price, which implies that @ i (p i ; p j ; 1; ) @p i p i =b(1 ), p j =0 = 3 2 1 2( ) 0 must hold. This yields the restriction (1 + 2 )=3. Hence, if < (1 + 2 )=3, a monopoly equilibrium exists, where the monopolist i sets the price p i = b(1 ), while the competitor cannot do better than setting its price to zero. We, therefore, obtain the same monopoly equilibria as stated in part ii) of Proposition 3.
We next consider the second interval of the demand function, where prices must ful…ll
We claim that there exists no equilibrium in this interval. We proceed by contradiction. If there exists an equilibrium, then each …rm maximizes its pro…ts which implies p i ( e i ) = t(3 + ) 3(1 ) b(1 2 e i ) 3 for …rm i and p j ( e i ) = t(3 ) 3(1 ) + b(1 2 e i ) 3 for …rm j. These prices determine the market share of …rm i which becomes q(p i ( e i ); p j ( e i ); e i ; ) = (3 + ) t (1 )6t + (1 )b(2 e i 1) 6t .
In equilibrium it must hold that q(p i ( e i ); p j ( e i ); e i ; ) = e i , which yields the market share of …rm i e i = (3 + ) 1 + 2(3 + 1) .
Using this market share we can compute the di¤erence in …rms'prices as p j (e i ) p i (e i ) = 2t (1 )(3 + 1) .
We now show that the di¤erence p j (e i ) p i (e i ) never lies within the assumed price interval.
Substituting (14) into the right-hand side of the second inequality of (13) we obtain b(1 2e i ) + t = b (1 3 ) 3 + 1 .
We can then rewrite the second inequality of (13) as t [ (3 + 1)] (1 )(3 + 1) < 0, which implies that (3 + 1) < 0 must hold. Substituting (14) into the left-hand side of the …rst inequality of (13), we obtain after some calculations the condition t [ (3 + 1)] (1 )(1 + )(3 + 1) > 0, which implies that (3 + 1) > 0 must hold. Note that the conditions (3 + 1) < 0 and (3 + 1) > 0 cannot hold simultaneously. Hence, an equilibrium with prices p j and p i that ful…ll (13) does not exist.
We, …nally, turn to the third interval of the demand function which requires (17) and (18), we can write …rms'prices as a function of consumer expectations as
which yield …rm i's market share q(p i ( e i ); p j ( e i ); e i ; ) = 2(1 ) e i + 3 2 1 6( ) .
Equating q(p i ( e i ); p j ( e i ); e i ; ) = e i , we get i = 1=2. Substituting i = 1=2 into (19) and (20) ).
Note …nally, that these prices together with i = 1=2 satisfy the two inequalities of (16). Q.E.D.
